floodproof new orleans and rebuild transportation

To:	katrinaNO05@yahoogroups.com
From:	"wholelephant" Add to Address Book Add Mobile Alert
Date:	Mon, 25 Sep 2006 21:41:30 -0000
Subject:	[katrinaNO05] floodproof new orleans and rebuild transportation

from
WHOLE ELEPHANT QUARTERLY
Summer 2006
Copyright 2006 by William F. Wendt, Jr.
Permission granted for non-commercial use if propoer credit is given.
FLOODPROOF NEW ORLEANS AND REBUILD TRANSPORTATION
Chicago Angles; Landswap The New Orleans airport remained dry, on
the one hand. On the other hand, who is dumb enough to believe that
anything will reliably patch the broken levees, especially the
crumbly clay, as exposed on PBS News-Hour and seconded by the
American Society of Civil Engineers?
At a late 1980s meeting to oppose a near west side Chicago
football stadium, a neighborhood old-timer said the suburbanites
returning to the city wanted to get away from the flooding out there,
much more than in the city itself. That means both the returning
suburbanites and inner-city Chicagoans are considerably smarter than
the New Orleaneans who want to rebuild flood ravaged neighborhoods in
the same place.
Checking out other stadium sites, the best one in particular, an
abandoned railroad yard being saved for still unrealized upscale
housing, led yours truly into investigating urban renewal.
That sort of thing can be fought, if people study their history
and get their heads together, but this is unfoolable Mother Nature.
There is simply no way to flood-proof the great extent of New
Orleans. Southeast Louisiana was formed by sediment washed down for
eons by the Mississippi. For eons it had been settling ever lower and
topped by incoming sediment. That is, until new sedimentation was
disrupted over the past century or so by development, supposedly
protected by ever extended levees and massive but inadequate pumps.
Such a disaster had been predicted for years. The 18th century
French nobleman who originally located the town was criticized for
putting it in such a precarious location.
Isn't the second one at least as predictable as the first? Maybe
even this year?
Is the rest of the country supposed to shed tears and cough up
more billions on that one too?
The former housing stock of New Orleans is now fit only for
landfills. Unless built on pontoons, any new or rebuilt housing stock
there could easily wind up the same way.
Or merely jacked up, as were buildings in 19th century Chicago to
get them out of the swamp. Two or three feet shouldn't be too bad,
but eight or ten or more in much of the town?
Why rebuild neighborhoods on the same land? Why not put new
housing on the airport land that remained dry? In recent yearsflooded
towns have been rebuilt outside flood plains; Valmeyer, Ill., south
of St. Louis, is one example.
Don't put anything in a flood plain that would be such a tragedy
if it got flooded.
And since the neighborhoods, industry, and transportation have to
be rebuilt anyway, why not look at a flood-proof form of
transportation?
Why not rebuild around a new, so far little tried form of
transportation, one that can do much more for much less?
Let's see how that little tried transit technology could sustain
a comfortable high density for the evacuated, carless poor.
Or simply make better use of existing airports. Every city needs
air travel, with one-third of its economy built on tourism, New
Orleans especially. It is a bit hard, of course, to plan airports or
anything else from 900 miles away, so these are only general
suggestions.
It is quite easy to describe a form of transportation, however,
that only needs columns every eighty feet or so on the ground, not
another swath through city or countryside, creates little or no
disruption of adjacent activities,
and creates many unrealized possibilities. It could allow diversion
of air traffic to Baton Rouge, sixty miles away, with a half hour
ride into New Orleans, faster than into most cities. What an entrance
into an exotic, romantic city!
A high speed intercity version could actually replace much air
travel and make a lot of airport capacity unnecessary, while using
existing highways and rail lines.
Other traffic might be diverted to the New Orleans municipal
airport, already built on fill in the lake, and other small, close-in
airports around the country. Let's try a long-proven aircraft that
can use much smaller airports, has a much greater safety margin at
cramped airports, uses much less fuel, is quiet, and is almost as
fast in the air. This same aircraft could also allow some airport
land to be used for housing while using the rest as an airport, at
least temporarily.
Let's look at a revival of seaplanes. Few population centers are
more than 100 miles from a large body of water; the Navy had a jet
seaplane minelayer in the 1950s that was faster and more efficient
than Air Force bombers of the day.
Given the troubles the airlines are having generally and the
problems with new airport construction, why not some other approach?
It is said that Chernobyl discredited the Soviet government and
contributed to its collapse. Katrina is raising similar questions
here.
Floodproof, Snowproof Transportation
There are monorails and there are monorails. This one is not the
Disneyland or Seattle type.
This monorail technology is flood-proof (and snow-proof), with
all major systems well above ground. An early installation at the
Miami Seaquarium survived hurricanes for thirty years. Yours truly
was in New Orleans in late 1963 when it had a three inch snowfall,
the largest ever at the time, and the place
went into a tizzy.
The vehicle is both propelled and suspended by a sort of
glorified clock motor. There is little more to a linear induction
motor than the grade school experiment in which a kid wraps wire
around a nail and makes an electromagnet. Such motors have long been
used in industry to move metals directly, from powders to ingots,
without intervening machinery. About 3/8" under a steel beam, it
exerts a magnetic force along the beam and about ten times as much
toward it. Acting directly on the beam, it does not need wheel-rail
traction.
Such a motor can easily handle highway grades if necessary. Heat from
eddy currents in the beam melt any snow or ice. Not quite pure
maglev, this technology uses caster wheels over and under the lower
flanges of the beam to keep it from falling or clamping up.
Maglev with training wheels?
The suspended vehicle does not need elaborate suspension or
braking systems, those replaced by the linear induction motor. It
could be standardized and mass-produced. Thus it only costs about as
much as a bus of similar capacity, about a half or a third as much as
a rail car.
The structure is a single overhead steel I-beam, supported every
eighty feet or so. It casts a shadow only two or three feet wide. It
costs about one-tenth as much as an elevated rapid transit structure,
not much more than a busway after land costs. It is inexpensive
enough to pay for itself with land value capture, without federal
funding. It does between buildings what elevators do between floors,
making about as much noise.
Underneath the beam,
the vehicle does not need heavy, elaborate structure to keep it from
tipping. Do you carry a bucket of water from above or below?
The power, 440 volt AC for city transit applications, is picked
up, not by sliding contact, but by induction from insulated wires,
with a moving transformer of sorts. It can also put power back into
the line quite easily. The operating expense of the automated system
would be little more than electricity and security.
The motor and controls are on top of the vehicle, ten feet or so
above the floor. The floor is normally fifteen feet or so above
ground level, although it need only be inches, if desired. Either
way, only the most extraordinary
floods or snow will ever be a problem.
The vehicle could be a skid that a bus could drive on and off.
There could be 30 mile, single-seat rides, one hour bus stop to bus
stop, with computer-matched riders. A switching mechanism (unlike
most other monorails) would allow express runs to by-pass local
service.
A heavy-duty version could get a lot of trucks off the road and
facilitate urban industrial development. Industry has long gone to
the suburbs for room to expand, but this technology could let
factories miles apart function as one. The conflicts that hamstring
high speed rail simply do not exist. The capital and operating costs
would be incomparably less than new rail routes with high speed
equipment.
Such a monorail could be built over existing expressways and
offer high speed service, freight and passenger, 200 mph or more. Its
speed is limited only by the safety and comfort of passengers.
Vehicles with standing passengers can only accelerate 3 miles per
hour per second, or 1/10 gravity. NASA is looking at a version to
launch satellites (Mechanical Engineering, Feb. 2000), the Navy to
catapult aircraft from aircraft carriers. (Invention and
Discovery, Spring 2006)
Transit for High-Density Housing
High density residential development got a bad name with the
tenements of a century ago and public housing high rises of recent
decades. High density housing does not have to be a pesthole,
however; just look at luxury high-rises .
There are profound advantages to high-density housing, even, or,
especially, for the poor, if properly handled. Shopping and many
services are likely within walking distance. Job and business
opportunities need not be so far away. Utility lines are much shorter
and less expensive. Large multi-unit buildings have less surface area
per unit, requiring less heating and cooling. In redeveloping inner
cities, it does not gobble up cornfields and orange groves.
What is the realistic alternative, more suburban sprawl?
The immediate problem is parking, more generally, the automobile.
There are physical limits to the density the automobile can support,
known as far back as World War II, Helen Leavitt, Superhighway,
Superhoax, or known as easily as getting caught in a suburban traffic
jam. High density housing needs some other form of transportation. It
has to do between buildings what an elevator does between floors.
Buses have obvious limitations, notably getting caught in traffic
and several coming at once. Special bus lanes need too much land.
Housing is built around transportation. Delores Hayden, Building
Suburbia. "Streetcar suburbs," as she calls them, were quite
successful a century ago, if not really that high a density, and
still are today, even without streetcars. They, too, however, get
caught in traffic, and require expensive
tracks and trolley wire.
Grade separated rapid transit offers high speed and capacity. It
is, however, very expensive, especially in a subway. Older steel
girder elevated structures are noisy and obtrusive; newer concrete
troughs with railroad ballast are quiet but extremely bulky. Stations
are also bulky and impractical less than a half-mile apart.
There is a people mover technology with automated rubber tire
vehicles, each operating on two reinforced concrete beams. Each beam
is about four feet high and ten inches wide, held aloft by columns
about eighty feet apart. Columns and stations are the only footprint.
There is no conflict with traffic.
Boarding at the enclosed stations is like getting on an elevator,
through two sets of sliding doors. A 1.4 mile example of this
technology effectively unifies the Clarian hospitals in Indianapolis
with a 5 minute ride.
The concrete beam structure, however, cannot allow switching from
one track to another. Each vehicle can only shuttle back and forth on
its own track. A top speed about 28 mph limits this rubber tire-
concrete beam technology to short trips.
The monorail beam is much lighter and less obtrusive than just
one people mover beam, Without track and running gear underneath, the
vehicle floor is four feet or more closer to street level. It need
only be inches above the street, if desired, for stations at street
level, say, at a shopping center. The headways could be much less
than rapid transit, allowing shorter trains and less obtrusive
stations. Vehicles could be built for fifty passengers or more, if
desired, thus allowing similar capacity or greater.
Such a technology should facilitate comfortable, convenient high
density residential development at a reasonable cost. .
The table below is calculated on constant acceleration of 3
mphps, or 1/10 gravity. Distance in feet is 1.5 seconds squared.
Average speed is half the speed at any instant.
sec v (ft/sec) v(mi/hr) vav(ft/sec) vav(mi/hr)
sec2
d(ft)
d(mi)
10 30 20.5 15 10.3 100 150 .028
20 60 40.9 30 20.5 400 600 .113
30 90 61.4 45 30.7 900 1350 .255
40 120 81.8 60 40.6 1600 2400 .455
50 150 102.3 75 51.7 2500 3750 .710
60 180 122.7 90 61.4 3600 5400 1.022
At 51 seconds the vehicle has gone 3/4 mile and reached a speed
of 153 mph. Thus it covers a mile and a half course, as in
Indianapolis, in 102 seconds, stop to stop, decelerating at the same
rate.
With a speed limit of 60 mph, the 1.5 mile distance takes 120
seconds.
With flat floors, the centrifugal force around curves would also
be limited to 1/10 g. Elevators, however, can accelerate 1/8 g. The
suspended monorail vehicle, swinging like a pendulum around curves
and pressing occupants into the floor, not along it, could thus take
curves that much faster.
Electra-fy the Airlines
Why not free up dry airport land for New Orleans housing? And why
not use close-in airports, not the least of which is Meigs?
The Electra is a 1950s turboprop that was quickly overshadowed by
jets back then. For today's needs, however, it is a long proven
aircraft that lands at about two-thirds the speed of jets, with half
the momentum. Thus it has much greater margins of safety in cramped
airports such as Midway.
It is also much quieter, uses much less fuel, and is almost as
fast in the air.It is the only large airliner quiet enough for the
Lake Tahoe airport.
The Electra was designed to be profitable on stages 100 to 3000
miles and use small airports. It flies almost 400 mph, thus giving
away little to 500 mph jets on short hops, much less if using small,
close-in airports.
Before going into O'Hare or Midway an Electra could easily stop
at Gary or a restored Meigs. If we really need south suburban
service, it could get into a slightly expanded Lansing airport,
rather than blow hundreds of millions on a Peotone boondoggle and
devastate the area. It could also stop at Rockford or Milwaukee,
where airport capacity, like Gary, goes unused.
Thus passengers could change planes at three airports or
disembark at a more convenient destination without changing at all.
The extra stops would take less time and bother than getting off one
plane and on another at a monster like O'Hare. Even the Chicago
Transit Authority does not make riders transfer all at one place. A
restored Meigs would be an extraordinarily convenient Chicago
destination.
Figure, again, the Electra would have plenty range to continue
another 500 miles or more, to, say, the Twin Cities, Omaha, or Kansas
City.
See the extensive article in the May 2003 Airpower on the
Electra. Also see Boyne, Beyond the Horizon: The Lockheed Story, that
it was designed by the same team as the C-130 Hercules. One is a
commercial airliner, the other a military assault transport that
needs a loading floor close to the ground. Yours truly once saw the
Hercules for the Navy Blue Angels land on the 3900' Meigs runway and
use barely half of it.
The Navy P-3 Orion patrol plane, in production for 40 years, is
merely an Electra with a shorter fuselage, so retooling is not a
problem. Orions on research flights into hurricanes rode smoothly
enough for people to walk in the aisles. The "short, rigid wings seem
to soak up turbulences, like a racing car suspension." Air & Space,
Aug/Sept 1999
The jet that crashed at Midway, heading northwest, landed into a
substantial tailwind. It did not approach the other way, or so this
publication hears, because of conflicts with O'Hare traffic patterns.
Who knows, the Electra might allow less conflicting patterns.
Meanwhile, too, as James Fallows reported in his June 2001
Atlantic article and recent book, the overall average speed for "hub
and spoke" airline passengers is a whole sixty miles per hour. A
resurrected Electra could easily beat that and put short haul air
travel on an entirely different basis.
Wet Airports
"... 70 percent of the world's surface is covered with
water... 80 percent of the world's economic activity on land takes
place within 150 miles of the sea. Most of the world's capital cities
are situated on the coast or on the banks of a river... water runways
cannot be destroyed by natural disasters or bombs..."
So concludes David Oliver, Wings Over Water: A Chronicle of the
Flying Boats and Amphibians of the Twentieth Century, a well
illustrated but still quite inexpensive history of seaplanes. His
last chapter anticipates a rebirth of seaplanes, citing Canadian,
Russian, British, French, American, and Japanese
developments, including a proposed nifty 40 passenger Japanese
amphibian jet STOL feederliner.
Seaplane airliners had their heyday before World War II, when
large aircraft needed long take-off runs and airports were scarce.
After the war, however, airports were much more common and landplanes
had become much more capable.
The aircraft industry generally considered seaplanes less
efficient than landplanes, due to the weight and shape of their
hulls. In the late 1950s, nevertheless, the Navy tested the Martin
P6M-2 Seamaster, a four jet, 75 ton, Mach 1 minelayer, as efficient
aerodynamically as Air Force bombers (Knott, The American Flying
Boat: An Illustrated History) or more so (Wings, December 1986),
despite being a seaplane, even designed to operate continuously
off water.
Furthermore, the "blended body" airliners on the drawing boards
for twice the passenger loads of jumbo jets could easily be designed
as seaplanes with little weight or aerodynamic penalty.
Do we really need to expand O'Hare or confiscate some 23,000
acres for a Peotone airport, even assuming projected air travel
growth?
We already have, then, an "airport" in the lake, minus the
electronics and landing lights for aircraft and a few buoys to warn
watercraft, perhaps with sonar to warn of floating debris. We have
long had, of course, Meigs Field right on the lake and the Gary
airport not far away, plus various harbors that might be converted to
seaplane use. Who knows what seaplanes might do to airport
controversies in the Chicago area?
Or for reconstruction of New Orleans?
There were safety and weather objections to the proposed airport
in the lake of about 1970, to be surrounded by a dike. Thetraditional
problem of seaplanes, to be sure, is hitting floating debris. The
Russians have considered VTOL and ground effect ideas to allow
operation on ice.
In 1945 the Glenn Martin Co. proposed gigantic seaplane terminals
with U-shaped tugboats. Large, expensive airports and heavy landing
gear would both be unnecessary. Ice and waves did not present
insuperable problems. The Marine News, January 1945
Evacuation by Bicycle
What if the stranded New Orleans masses, too poor to own
automobiles, a few desperate enough to walk, had
bicycles? Let's do some back-of-the- envelope calculations.
For some years now Critical Mass bike rides in Chicago have
attracted several dozen to several hundred riders for lighthearted
rides of an hour or two, meandering around near downtown
neighborhoods. They generally average 5 mph or somewhat more. Mid-
winter rides to a polka bar on the other side of Midway, about eleven
miles, were considerably faster over more direct routes, about an
hour and a half on the road.
Ten hours of riding, thus, should get one out of a disaster
zone. No gas is necessary. As with getting around the city every day,
it beats waiting for a bus.
Figure each bike in such a convoy needs roadspace about fifteen
feet long and five feet wide. It can easily take fifteen minutes for
several hundred to pass by. That is still much more efficient use of
the roads than
automobiles.
Figure, too, that bicycle campers generally carry about 30 or
more pounds of gear. Bicycles with 500 pounds of gear were often
walked down the Ho Chi Minh trail.
There are various seats and trailers available for the younger
generation. Some even have pedals to help burn off the excess energy,
however long that lasts.
There is a bike winter movement in Chicago that encourages riding
in cold weather. It is much more practical than the uninitiated
realize. There is a website and a public instructional meeting around
Thanksgiving. What can you do with a bike that you can't with a car?
Carry it.
Bicycles can generally be carried in other vehicles, although
small cars without racks are a problem. They can be ridden
through several inches of water and walked though two or three feet,
although that has obvious hazards.
For such purposes one would avoid racing bikes with delicate
tires, also racing and mountain bikes with uncomfortable riding
positions. One would want rugged tires and an upright riding
position, probably a touring or hybrid bike.
A decent new bike can be had for about $300, used ones for less.
A bicycle can be easily replaced, of course, if necessary.
As with a battlefield situation, one would not want to face such
a situation unprepared and alone. Anyone who has not ridden a bicycle
for a while will have to develop some new muscles quick, physical and
mental.
There are lively bicycle social scenes in Chicago and elsewhere
that could accomodate total strangers in time of stress. Getting
acquain-ted beforehand would obviously be much to the better, for,
shall we say, a Critical Mess ride.
There has been considerable hue and cry about the neglect of poor
blacks in New Orleans, amidst speculation that the powers-that- be
would have been more concerned about whites. That speculation,
however, is speculation. Right or wrong, it could be very foolish for
white people or anyone else to rely on it, or on the tender concern
of any bureaucracy.
From here it seems the difference in neglect happened before
Katrina, not after. Not speculation is the white sheriff of
Plaquemines Parish saying they would have died if they waited for
federal aid and refusing to talk to FEMA representatives, nor the
white president of Jefferson Parish accusing the federal government
of murder. Don't expect centralized bureaucracies to care
about anything but themselves, but that is a continuing topic.
.
An article in the November 2005 Liberty said everyone in New
Orleans who had a car got out. To which yours truly sent a letter
which opened, as printed in the January 2006 Liberty:
"Has Randal O'Toole ever heard of Houston? Or Rita? Or the 100
mile traffic jam? Can the automobile really evacuate a whole city?
Sure, it might work when only part of the population uses it, "Riding
Out the Storm," November 2005. Hasn't he ever been caught in a
traffic jam?
His article on saving passenger trains in the April 2006 issue
got this response, in part:
"Not so trivial is citing some unnamed government source alleging
negligible subsidies for air and highway travel, as if they were
creations of a near
free market..."
"Nor is expecting an antiquated technology, even of such blessed
memory, to meet future needs. The thumbnail area of contact between
wheel and rail might be a hallmark of efficiency for hauling coal and
grain. For passenger vehicles, however, it requires large, rigid
masses in constant impact, concentrated stresses, complicated,
expensive suspension and braking systems, and tank-like structures
with million pound buff and draft capability for safety on the
main line...."

branch line lokie

To:	steam_tech@yahoogroups.com
From:	"wholelephant" Add to Address Book Add Mobile Alert
Date:	Sun, 17 Sep 2006 20:09:18 -0000
Subject:	[steam_tech] branch line lokie

Since branch lines often do not have turning facilities, how about a bi-
directional engine, and since the little streaks of rust do not have
good track very often either, how about a geared, bi-directional engine?

Geared engines are more or less bi-directional to start with and their
trucks negotiate bad track with more felicity than the rigid
underframes of rod engines.

How about a Heisler layout, so we can play transmission games with the
shafts at right angles? The Model T planetary transmission, with gears
constantly in mesh, and shifting done by grabbing the ring gear or the
planetary web, might be a starting point. Even if the locomotive had to
stop to shift, two speeds would make it considerably more versatile.

We might look at the outboard motor clutch in which the vertical shaft
turns a bevel gear, in turn two more bevel gears on the horizontal
shaft, in opposite directions, of course. Each of these gears turns a
coil. When a solenoid in the shaft is engaged, it grabs the end of the
coil, in turn wrapping it around the shaft, and engaging the clutch.
With a two speed transmission, it would be a good lugging and running
engine both. Maybe there still is a two speed bicycle coaster brake
that shifts every time the brake is touched.

For intermittent, seasonal use, under primitive maintenance conditions,
such an engine would not need sophisticated thermodynamic efficiency
devices. Who knows, a market might develop for such a locomotive in
year around use with proper maintenance facilities, in which use such
devices might be justified.

For seasonal use it would be essentially a glorified steam tractor,
bringing the fertilizer in and taking the harvest out. A fleet of them
might even follow the harvest like migratory combines do. The
considerably lower capital cost ought to revise branch line economics.
One factor in the branch line controversy has been the road damage done
by trucks replacing rail service.

Such a locomotive might be the steam road switcher DPM thought
impossible in 1950, doing the branch lines like a Consolidation, the
transfers like a Mikado, industrial sidings like a switcher, and
commuter runs like a Pacific.

Steam's Finest Hour recorded dual service Canadian Pacific light
Pacifics bought right up to dieselization, and with 275 lb. psi!
CP also had a legion of superannuated Ten Wheelers for seasonal use,
although I cannot remember where I read that.

The March 1978 TRAINS (p12, not listed in the table of contents, but
the same issue that had a nice wrap-around painting of steam engines on
both covers)had a comment by former railroad president Perry Shoemaker
on such an engine.It's just awful, being ahead of your time and waiting
all these years for the world to catch up, isn't it?

Intermodal Advisory Task Force meeting

To:	PeoriaandEastern@yahoogroups.com
From:	"wholelephant" Add to Address Book Add Mobile Alert
Date:	Wed, 13 Sep 2006 21:36:06 -0000
Subject:	[PeoriaandEastern] IATF meeting

The Intermodal Advisory Task Force of the Chicago Area Transportation
Study had a meeting Sept. 13 in its new offices in the Sears Tower. I
got in just a bit late because of a hassle over photo ID but heard
most of a BNSF presentation on the CREATE program. After hearing the
usual complaints about freight being ignored and about tapping into
various funds, I asked about tapping into downstate routes to keep
through traffic out of Chicago. The answer went beyond the usual
business-as- usual-we' ve-always- done-it-this- way to a statement that
the railroads already looked into it and did not think there would be
enough traffic. I asked for something in black and white but was told
nothing would be sent. They made much mention of lobbying Sens.
Durbin and Obama and Rep. Lipinski but two can play that game. Maybe
Rep LaHood would like to chime in. They ought to be grateful if
someone else is interested in freight. I also mentioned this group
and its erudite discussion and that you do not have to say you are a
CREATE spy. They concluded with observations that freight traffic was
expanding faster than their predictions. They are trying to get
public money and of course we all have some say in that, don't we?

There was another report on the new, booming markets for specialized,
high-value agricultural products for which bulk transportation is not
appropriate, and, of every four containers returning to the Orient,
only one is loaded. It seems a lot of this has just started going
through the new intermodal terminals near Rochelle and Joliet. It
also seems that ethanol production is taking off and one by-product
is a high-quality cattle feed. I asked if all this stuff had to be
trucked north, that maybe such terminals ought to be located in the
corn and beans country. We can find places for one or two, can't we?

next steps and short course, high speed steam

To:	steam_tech@yahoogroups.com
From:	"wholelephant" Add to Address Book Add Mobile Alert
Date:	Thu, 24 Aug 2006 16:24:48 -0000
Subject:	[steam_tech] next steps & short course

NEXT STEPS
What these 48,000+ postings need is a list of Frequently Used Search
Terms (FUST). It would save a lot of shooting in the dark. Some of
them could use a tag, such as hfbrown, since a search for h f brown
will turn up any number of listings for derek, marcellus, etc., fine
fellows, undoubtedly, or they would not be posted here, but not hf.
There are lies, damn lies, and statistics, said Mark Twain.
Unfortunately many decisions in this industrial age have to be made by
the numbers. Brown's numbers are not Gospel, to be sure. I personally
would like to see a breakdown by kinds of road service, drag freight,
fast freight, and passenger, if that is at all possible. Somewhat
beyond the scope of his paper are the artificially low interest rates
of the period, a powerful subsidy for the more capital-intensive
diesel and for such time-consuming, far removed in time from consumer
sale investments as extraction, raw materials and heavy machinery, per
Mises business cycle theory. Likewise, depletion allowances, at the
time 27% for oil and 10% or so for coal. Still, his numbers are the
best we have and still fertile, little tapped, grist for the
pencil-pushers DPM left the matter to in 1961. Beyond the numbers,
nevertheless, is the pointed, animated discussion.
As for economic interests, Brown was an advocate of electrification,
even more capital intensive, of course, than dieselization.
Pinkepank's July 1970 TRAINS article on electrification, again, can be
updated in twenty-five words or less. The economic and ethical
pitfalls of electrification, as long as we are into that sort of
thing, more or less generally the Tom Swift/Lyndon LaRouche approach
to high technology, are concretely demonstrated in Vol. 131 of the
Interstate Commerce Commission reports, the 1928 Milwaukee Road
bankruptcy. The electrification was celebrated for the train coming
down the hill powering the train going up, but the copper, electrical,
and banking interests on the CMStP&P board had the railroad buy twice
as much electricity as it really needed, not that the west coast
extension was such a good idea to begin with. Also see Vol 31 on the
New Haven and how business was sometimes done then, the mileau in
which Brown got started. The ICC reports should be readily available
in most large law libraries. Also see William Z. Ripley's books of
that period. All of this makes talk of GM conspiracies seem rather tame.
In light of recent postings and the spate of recent books on oil and
(less debatably) capital running out, who knows exactly when, it would
seem there are three markets for new steam emerging:
1. A stop-gap locomotive, a not quite off-the-shelf grand old trouper
that could be tooled up quickly. My nomination would be the van
Sweringen Berkshire, which compiled a superb record on several
railroads, likewise accumulated widespread experience on fan trips,
and which, even a half century and three generations into
dieselization, could probably handle over half of today's road
assignments, freight and passenger. Much the same tooling could also
produce the KCS 2-10-4 and the C&O T-1/PRR J1. If project three,
below, stalls, we might also consider the N&W A and, as diesels
deplete, the Y6b.
2. A branch line, light duty local freight locomotive, an updated
Consolodation or light Mikado, a simple, basic machine of low capital
cost and maintenance.
3. A fast, heavy freighter, more or less an updated N&W Class A. The
principal decision is between turbine or divided compound drive, which
undoubtedly will require some in-the-metal experimentation and thus a
substantial research budget. 12,000 hp should be quite a reasonable goal.

A SHORT COURSE ON CENTRALIZED "ECONOMICS"
Let's clean up an ethnic joke. Two members of an ethnic group had ben
friends all their lives and one was dying. He asked his friend to pour
a fifth of their ethnic beverage on his grave on the anniversary of
his death and got bck, "Do you mind if I do it through my kidney?"
A city kid on a farm saw a cow and was told that is where his milk
comes from. It does not, says the kid; it comes from a bottle.
How do we get it from the bottle without mistaking it for the cow?
Why is it that even the most prodigious better mousetrap builders,
George
Westinghouse, say, cannot beat a good enough path to financial resources?
In a centralized economy it is hard. Economic survival is too often a
matter of getting it through the kidney, not of building a better
mousetrap. Unlearning is more difficult than learning. But let's try.
Centralized finance is a system of subsidy and protection that favors
some enterprises and disfavors others, there being no free lunch. The
Wealth of Nations is little but an expose` of protection. The 1820s
controversy over the Second Bank of the United States was inflamed by
its president's statement that he had not used its power to hurt other
banks, prompting the retort that they existed by his forbearance. The
anti-Bank Jacksonians spoke with forked tongue, however, since their
banks expanded like crazy when the federal Bank was no longer around
to moderate their issues and shortly plunged the country into a boom
and bust. In the 1820s also Henry Clay proposed his "American System"
of high tariffs, internal improvements (public works), and paper
money, finally implemented by Abraham Lincoln, establishing corporate
welfare, according to Thomas DiLorenzo, The Real Lincoln. Newly
installed railroad lawyers on the Supreme Court overturned a ruling
barely a year old against Civil War greenbacks, amidst fears of
curtailing development, according to Gustavus Myers, History of the
Supreme Court. The "Progressive Era" reforms were not brought about by
outraged populists, but by financial interests seeking to curb
competition, according to Gabriel Kolko, Railroads and Regulation and
The Triumph of Conservatism.
Read the ten planks of the Communist Manifesto and ask yourself what
would be the more drastic change in early third millenium industrial
society, to fulfill them or to abolish them. Also read a couple
paragraphs ahead, that they are intended to establish a despotic
control over capital.
Also see Ferdinand Lundberg, America's 60 Families, on the 1915
speach Morgan partner Thomas Lamont gave on the financial consequences
of WWI. Depending on the duration of the war, he said several times in
less than a page, American capital would be able to take over projects
heretofore financed by England, France, and Germany, and the dollar
would become the reserve currency of the world.
"War Is Peace," 1984, is merely this system of capital destruction
carried to a logical, indeed, Keynsian, conclusion. Keynes actually
said wars, earthquakes, and pyramid-building serve to increase wealth.
Also see Galbraith, The Age of Uncertainty, on Hitler being the first
Keynesian. Excessive as military expenditures are, they are far from
the only way of dissipating capital, however, transportation
boondoggles being a prime auxiliary.
With the insight of hindsight over the past century an a half, it can
be fairly said the ten planks do as intended. Within a year or two of
the Manifesto, Frederic Bastiat, Economic Harmonies, said of economic
centralization:
"It is quite common, however, to attribute to capital a kind of
deadly efficiency that would plant selfishness, hardness, and
Machiavellian duplicity in the hearts of those who possess it. But is
this not confused thinking? There are countries where labor is mainly
fruitless. The little that is earned must go quickly for taxes. In
order to take from you the fruit of your labor, what is called the
state loads you with fetters of all kinds. It interferes in all your
activities; it meddles in all your dealings; it tyrannizes over your
understanding and your faith; it deflects people from their natural
pursuits and places them all in precarious and unnatural positions; it
paralyzes the activities and the energies of the individual by taking
upon itself the direction of all things; it places responsibility for
what is done upon those who are not responsible, so that little by
little the distinction between what is just and what is unjust becomes
blurred; it embroils the nation, through its diplomacy, in all the
petty quarrels of the world, and then it brings in the army and the
navy; as much as it can, it perverts the intelligence of the masses on
economic questions, for it needs to make them believe that its
extravagances, its unjust aggressions, its conquests, its colonies,
represent a source of wealth for them. In these countries it is
difficult for capital to be accumulated in natural ways. Their aim,
above all, is by force and guile to wrest capital from those who have
created it. The way to wealth there is through war, bureaucracy,
gambling, government contracts, speculation, fraudulent transactions,
risky enterprises, public sales, etc. The qualities needed to snatch
capital violently from the hands of the men who create it are exactly
the opposite of the qualities that are necessary for its formation. It
is not surprising, therefore, that in those countries CAPITAL connotes
ruthless SELFISHNESS; and this connotation becomes ineradicable if the
moral judgements of the nation are derived from the history of
antiquity and the Middle Ages."
Another century and a half earlier John Locke said:
"... great robbers punish little ones to keep them in their
obedience, but the great ones are rewarded with laurels and triumphs,
because they are too big for the weak hands of justice in this world
and have the power in their hands which should punish offenders... "
Second Treatise of Government, 176
Orwell and Bastiat both died of tuberculosis in their late forties in
the late forties of their respective centuries, and both offered their
parodies of Keynesian "spend ourselves rich" "economics."
The government is indeed the executive committee of the ruling class.
What to do about it? In short, scab on the capital union. As Adam
Smith put it,
"As the quantity of stock to be lent at interest increases, the
interest, the price which must be paid for the use of that stock,
necessarily diminishes, not only from those general causes which make
the market price of things commonly diminish as their quantity
increases, but from other causes which are peculiar to this particular
case. As capitals increase in any country, the profits which can be
made by employing them necessarily diminish. It becomes gradually more
and more difficult to find within the country a profitable method of
employing any new capital. There arises in consequence a competition
between different capitals, the owner of one endeavoring to get
possession of that employment which is occupied by another. But on
most occasions he can hope to justle that other out of this employment
by no other means but by dealing on more reasonable terms. he must not
only sell what he deals in somewhat cheaper, but in order to get it to
sell, he must sometimes too buy it dearer. The demand for productive
labor, by the great increase in funds which are destined for
maintaining it, grows every day greater and greater. Labourers easily
find employment, but the owners of capitals find it difficult to get
labourers to employ. Their competition raises the wages of labor, and
sinks the profits of stock. But when the profits which can be made by
the use of a capital are in this manner diminished, as it were, the
price which can be paid for the use of it, that is, the rate of
interest, must necessarily be diminished with them."
What more succinct a description of economic progress is there, even
if it does not recognize new production? It also explains why
entrenched capitalists do not want capital getting into competing
hands. As Grameen Bank founder Mohammad Yunus updates it,
"If we imagine a world where every human being is a potential
entrepreneur, we'll build a system to give everybody a chance to
materialize his or her potential. The heavy wall between the
`entrepreneur' and `labor' will be meaningless. If labor had access to
capital, this world would be very different from what we have now. We
build what we imagine. In the past we have imagined the wrong way
[and] as a result we got a wrong world. By formulating our axioms the
right way, we can create the right world.
"In the `right' world, we'll have to forget that people should wait
around to be hired by somebody. We must install in everybody's mind
that each person creates his or her own job. We'll build institutions
in such a way that each person is empowered to create his or her own
job: self-employment. Wage employment will come into the picture only
as an alternative to self-employment. The more self-employment becomes
attractive, wide-ranging, and self-fulfilling, the more difficult it
will be to attract people for wage jobs. Women, minority groups, the
physically handicapped, and the socially handicapped will benefit from
self-employment becoming more rewarding and convenient."
Since time immemorial leftists have wanted to take from the rich and
give to the poor, quite without figuring what would happen if the rich
could not take from the poor, or the build-a-better- mousetrap
builders, in the first place.
But figure the market is a computer. If you do not like the garbage
coming out, then keep it from going in. Maybe then it will be possible
to build a better mousetrap without getting embroiled in all sorts of
gamesmanship.
Build-a-better- mousetrap builders of the world, unite! You have
nothing to lose but the parasites taking from you and demanding
tribute to get it back!

economic case for high speed steam, cont. again

To:	steam_tech@yahoogroups.com
From:	"wholelephant" Add to Address Book Add Mobile Alert
Date:	Mon, 21 Aug 2006 18:18:12 -0000
Subject:	[steam_tech] h f brown presentation

H.F. Brown, "Economic Results of Diesel Electric Motive Power
on the Railways of the United States of America," Institution of
Mechanical Engineers, London, was printed in the institute's
proceedings, Vol 175 No 5 1961, p257 ff, comprising the initial
statement in two parts, discussion by nine members attending
the presentation beginning p 275, communications apparently
from those not attending beginning p283, the author's reply
begining p292, and a one page report of an ordinary (sic- those
limeys!) on p318. There were mentions of an advance copy, one
of which is in the Northwestern U Transportation Library. There
are many charts and graphs.
Maybe it is on-line somewhere. If not, maybe the Institute can be
inveigled to put it on-line or otherwise make it available.
Otherwise check large engineering libraries. Again, I am amazed
that in some 48,000 postings here there does not seem to be
any discussion of it.

On the same March 1961 editorial page that DPM chided
unimaginative management, he also set a still durable editorial
policy:
"We of TRAINS know and respect Mr. Brown as both a reader
and a provocative correspondent. Moreover, we would
instinctively lean toward those who would question the status
quo and/or debate The Big Claim. It is perhaps surprising, in this
instance, that no one of authority has taken issue with
dieselization since Lima gave up the ghost and Roanoke quit
building locomotives. Finally, we are not prepared to engage in
point-by-point rebuttal to Mr. Brown's paper, being content to
leave such statistical cross-fire to more qualified pencil-pushers
than ourselves and to those with more selfish claims (diesel
builders and owners)."
As for his own pencil-pushing, the next paragraph refers to N&W
2-6-6-4s hauling 14,500 ton coal trains and having a 107,525 lb.
axle loading. His own Steam's Finest Hour, however, lists the
Class A having 432,350 lb. on drivers, or some 72,000 lb. per
axle. He also considered it equivalent to three 1750 hp. six axle
units. In that regard, consider the modest effort by yours truly,
which he rejected in 1980, which has actually held up quite well,
other than the exceptions afterwards:

DID EDITOR MORGAN AND ACE BOTH SPEAK TOO SOON?
A recently purchased April 1950 TRAINS has these comments
by its present editor:
"... The road switcher... was a locomotive refreshingly new to the
industry- a class of power unlikely in electrification, out of the
question in steam...
"At one stroke, this unit... could replace a score of specialized
steam designs. The Pacific that held down suburban 5:15's, the
short wheelbase 0-6-0 that worked tight industrial sidings, the
low-drivered Mike assigned for yard-to-yard transfer hauls, the
branch-line 0-8-0- all could be doubled for by a stock model
1500 horsepower diesel of this flexible design." (p19)
In June 1974, however, editor Morgan printed Bill Withuhn's
major query as to whether steam was scrapped too soon. It
seems indeed that technology existing in the late 1940s could
have been used to produce a locomotive highly competitive with
the diesel, overcoming many of steam's traditional limitations.
The locomotives Withuhn elaborated upon, however, with such
features as high-speed compounding, balanced four cylinder
interconnected drives, double Belpaire fireboxes, high-speed
boosters and Geisl exhausts, were aimed at lash-ups of 6,000
plus horsepower, not at the humble but far more threatening
road-switcher. Withuhn's superb effort needs a follow-up, one
that may prove the then associate editor somewhat but quite
understandably short-sighted.
Perhaps Withuhn's collection of technology could have been
applied to the likes of the 4-6-4T used by Jersey Central or the
4-6-6T on the Boston and Albany. Another two or four wheels
would be needed to support the high pressure cylinders, which
might have to be placed inside with cut-outs to clear the rear
driving axle. Thus we might have a locomotive with the speed of
the Pacific, the agility of the 0-6-0, the tractive effort of the
low-drivered Mike, and the low axle loading of the 2-8-0. It could
even run in either direction, the same as a road-switcher. The
only trick left is multiple unit capability, but the N&W was halfway
there with its Automatic 4-8-0. So far this exercise has been
confined to the situation thirty years ago, as was Withuhn's.
Today, however, a commuter locomotive would need a 600 hp.
turbogenerator for HEP commuter cars, which in freight service
might power traction motors replacing high maintainance
boosters.
Certainly there is much to be said for looking back, perhaps for
its own sake, but more importantly as an invaluable guide in
looking ahead. With that in mind the question for American Coal
Enterprises is whether the proposed ACE 3000 constitutes
dedieselization or redieselization instead. Per figures in Dec.
1980 TRAINS, it would save the railroads $1.2 billion a year in
fuel costs, certainly an impressive figure, reminiscent of a major
advantage diesel had over steam. It would replace GP-40-2s on
a four for five basis; at $1.25 million a copy 16,000 ACE 3000s
costing $20 billion would replace 20,000 Geeps costing costing
$15 billion at $750,000 apiece. If current inflation rates and taxes
require something like a 28% return on investment just to break
even, the railroads would lose something like $200 million a
year on the ACE 3000s. The figures of course are sketchy to say
the least, but if they are anywhere close to target they ironically
echo H.F.Brown's argument of twenty years ago that the
operating savings of diesels were substantially outweighed by
their increased capital costs.
Thus the ACE 3000 apparently forsakes the traditional
advantage of steam locomotives, that of substantially lower
capital costs. Thus also it is aimed at the wrong shortage. The
present economic crisis is not so much an oil or energy
shortage as it is a capital shortage. A severe questioning is long
overdue not only for the excessively capital intensive "high
technology" celebrated by J.K. Galbraith in THE NEW
INDUSTRIAL STATE but even more for its financing. Such
technology in Galbraith's view requires such heavy capital
outlays so far in advance of production that the market for the
product may well evaporate by the time production is completed.
Thus "management of demand" in specific markets and
"regulation of aggregate demand" for the economy as a whole.
Without "regulation of aggregate demand," Galbraith said in
1967, capital and technology would have to be used far more
cautiously; without it we would see a market economy in which
planning would be impossible, in which the small firm would at
last do quite well, making simple products with unspecialized
labor. We would have to renounce the technology we have been
taught to revere since birth, however. What Galbraith reveals,
albeit between the lines, is that "high technology" is by no means
a product of the market economy, but is rather that of an
elaborate and deliberate system of subsidy and protection. Its
justification is not economic but political; in other words, it is a
sacred cow.
H.F. Brown's argument that the capital costs of diesel
locomotives outweighed their operating savings is all the more
forceful when we realize that Keynesian "regulation of aggregate
demand" artificially lowered interest rates in the period he
considered. Such policies have caused the dissipation of capital
our economy now suffers from and with their end we can expect
to see an economy that conserves rather than dissipates capital.
Thus also we will see a drastic shift in technology, when
boondoggles cannot be financed by an artificial demand and
when interest rates accurately reflect capital costs. This is when
steam locomotives will make a comeback, but probably not ACE
3000s. A refinement of Withuhn's 1974 proposals will be more
what the situation calls for, as their capital costs should be little
more than traditional steam locomotives' . Even traditional steam
locomotives would be competitive with diesels in the
forthcoming economic environment. Already the Crab Orchard
and Egyptian has restored a 2-8-0 for $50,000 rather thqn buy a
second-hand diesel or $250,000. (RAILFAN & RAILROAD, July
1980) Thus Perry Shoemaker's prediction that rising capital and
oil costs will bring steam back to the branch lines (TRAINS,
March 1978) has already begun to come true.
It is on fast, heavy freights, however, that the steam locomotive
should find its true home. Compare performance figures for the
EMD SD45 (TRAINS, January 1974) with the feats of the N&W
Class A. A Class A could AVERAGE over 30 mph start to stop
with a 14,500 coal train (STEAM'S FINEST HOUR) while an
SD45 can only do 35 mph with a 5,000 ton train on straight, level
track. On straight, level track a Class A hauled a 7,500 ton train at
64 mph (N&W: GIANT OF STEAM, p192), while three SD45s are
required to haul a 5,000 ton train at 62 mph. The Nickel Plate
determined in the late 1940s that replacing its Berkshires with
three unit diesels on only four fast freights would cost an
additional $250,000 and reduce train speeds to boot. (TRAINS,
October 1962)
H. F. Brown noted twenty years ago that the N&W contracted its
first major debt for dieselization, having previously financed
major improvements out of earnings. A failure to explore capital
conserving technology certainly raises the question whether the
railroads are being soaked with massive debts as in times past
and gives credence to John Kneiling's cynicism that the
railroads are not being run for their own profits but rather those
of banks and suppliers (TRAINS, August 1980) Best wishes, by
all means, to American Coal Enterprises, but please, please,
take a very hard look at the capital costs of your proposal
compared to those of diesels and traditional steam locomotives.

Corrections since 1980-
Kevin Holland's book on the van Sweringen Berkshires raises
questions about the Nickel Plate tests.
LeMassena's July 1993 article in MAINLINE MODELER on
Class A mysteries said the 7500 tons was apparently a misprint
for 750, as on a heavy passenger train.
The Crab Orchard & Egyptian experiment fizzled.
Can anyone explain how a 7,000 hp souped up four unit F7
could haul those N&W trains almost as fast as the three SD45s
with over half agai the rated hp, other than the runs being slightly
downhill?

DPM had apparently forgotten what electrification advocate
Middleton wrote in Trains, November 1959:
"The 2-8-8-4 set a steady pace as it rolled off the miles of nearly
level and tangent track, with the Valve Pilot speed recorder
showing a 27 to 28 miles per hour (the limit for loaded ore trains
is 30 miles per hour).If the 228 had the devil's own time getting
started, she was really rolling now. It is the frequent observation
of Missabe Road men that, though the diesels can start and pull
more, steam, once rolling, can move tonnage over the railroad in
better time. And the M4 was ably demonstrating this
characteristic. "
Ironically and unthinkably enough, yet again, in that very same
issue of Trains, DPM himself gave perhaps the most dramatic
example of steam's advantage at speed, quite the opposite of
the diesels on the Super C test:
"... for the (PRR) T1's must always be remembered for being the
last of the high-wheelers- the final specimens of steam
designed and built to run 100 miles per hour. The severest T1
critic invariably relents on this point, too. The engineers and
firemen who sweated out the teething troubles still nod and say,
'Run? Oh, yes... how they could run!' I rode not many
high-wheelers but at least a fair sampling. And I recall how on
the 5507 when the hogger tugged at the throttle when we were
hitting 70 to 75 the great racer literally surged forward..."
As far as that goes, John Crosby recalled his last run firing a T1,
it still having a reserve at 110 and topping out at 120. (August
1993)

Brown said that when diesels emerged from high mileage
special service into general assignments, they could no longer
accumulate such mileage. DPM rather elliptically turned vice into
virtue in that same April 1950 TRAINS:
"... because a new steam locomotive could still depreciate its
investment on a monthly mileage less than its capacity, the true
long-distance assignments that man of them were quite capable
of handling had to await the diesel. The diesel offered no choice;
to earn money on its far greater cost, a carrier had to keep it in
service every possible hour."

The November 1963 article on Lima diesels gave Brown much
more respectful attention. Pinkepank and Sennhauser said Lima
could not be blamed for sticking with steam on fast, heavy
freights when the diesel was least convincing there and Brown
made his argument years later.

economic case for high speed steam, cont.

To:	steam_tech@yahoogroups.com
From:	"wholelephant" Add to Address Book Add Mobile Alert
Date:	Fri, 18 Aug 2006 21:43:57 -0000
Subject:	[steam_tech] economic case for high speed steam

H.F. Brown, "Economic Results of Diesel Electric Motive Power
on the Railways of the United States of America," Institution of
Mechanical Engineers, London, was printed in the institute's
proceedings, Vol 175 No 5 1961, p257 ff, comprising the initial
statement in two parts, discussion by nine members attending
the presentation beginning p 275, communications apparently
from those not attending beginning p283, the author's reply
begining p292, and a one page report of an ordinary (sic- those
limeys!) on p318. There were mentions of an advance copy, one
of which is in the Northwestern U Transportation Library. There
are many charts and graphs.
Maybe it is on-line somewhere. If not, maybe the Institute can be
inveigled to put it on-line or otherwise make it available.
Otherwise check large engineering libraries. Again, I am amazed
that in some 48,000 postings here there does not seem to be
any discussion of it.
On the same March 1961 editorial page that DPM chided
unimaginative management, he also set a still durable editorial
policy:
"We of TRAINS know and respect Mr. Brown as both a reader
and a provocative correspondent. Moreover, we would
instinctively lean toward those who would question the status
quo and/or debate The Big Claim. It is perhaps surprising, in this
instance, that no one of authority has taken issue with
dieselization since Lima gave up the ghost and Roanoke quit
building locomotives. Finally, we are not prepared to engage in
point-by-point rebuttal to Mr. Brown's paper, being content to
leave such statistical cross-fire to more qualified pencil-pushers
than ourselves and to those with more selfish claims (diesel
builders and owners)."
As for his own pencil-pushing, the next paragraph refers to N&W
2-6-6-4s hauling 14,500 ton coal trains and having a 107,525 lb.
axle loading. His own Steam's Finest Hour, however, lists the
Class A having 432,350 lb. on drivers, or some 72,000 lb. per
axle. He also considered it equivalent to three 1750 hp. six axle
units. In that regard, consider the modest effort by yours truly,
which he rejected in 1980, which has actually held up quite well,
other than the exceptions afterwards:

DID EDITOR MORGAN AND ACE BOTH SPEAK TOO SOON?
A recently purchased April 1950 TRAINS has these comments
by its present editor:
"... The road switcher... was a locomotive refreshingly new to the
industry- a class of power unlikely in electrification, out of the
question in steam...
"At one stroke, this unit... could replace a score of specialized
steam designs. The Pacific that held down suburban 5:15's, the
short wheelbase 0-6-0 that worked tight industrial sidings, the
low-drivered Mike assigned for yard-to-yard transfer hauls, the
branch-line 0-8-0- all could be doubled for by a stock model
1500 horsepower diesel of this flexible design." (p19)
In June 1974, however, editor Morgan printed Bill Withuhn's
major query as to whether steam was scrapped too soon. It
seems indeed that technology existing in the late 1940s could
have been used to produce a locomotive highly competitive with
the diesel, overcoming many of steam's traditional limitations.
The locomotives Withuhn elaborated upon, however, with such
features as high-speed compounding, balanced four cylinder
interconnected drives, double Belpaire fireboxes, high-speed
boosters and Geisl exhausts, were aimed at lash-ups of 6,000
plus horsepower, not at the humble but far more threatening
road-switcher. Withuhn's superb effort needs a follow-up, one
that may prove the then associate editor somewhat but quite
understandably short-sighted.
Perhaps Withuhn's collection of technology could have been
applied to the likes of the 4-6-4T used by Jersey Central or the
4-6-6T on the Boston and Albany. Another two or four wheels
would be needed to support the high pressure cylinders, which
might have to be placed inside with cut-outs to clear the rear
driving axle. Thus we might have a locomotive with the speed of
the Pacific, the agility of the 0-6-0, the tractive effort of the
low-drivered Mike, and the low axle loading of the 2-8-0. It could
even run in either direction, the same as a road-switcher. The
only trick left is multiple unit capability, but the N&W was halfway
there with its Automatic 4-8-0. So far this exercise has been
confined to the situation thirty years ago, as was Withuhn's.
Today, however, a commuter locomotive would need a 600 hp.
turbogenerator for HEP commuter cars, which in freight service
might power traction motors replacing high maintainance
boosters.
Certainly there is much to be said for looking back, perhaps for
its own sake, but more importantly as an invaluable g;uide in
looking ahead. With that in mind the question for American Coal
Enterprises is whether the proposed ACE 3000 constitutes
dedieselization or redieselization instead. Per figures in Dec.
1980 TRAINS, it would save the railroads $1.2 billion a year in
fuel costs, certainly an impressive figure, reminiscent of a major
advantage diesel had over steam. It would replace GP-40-2s on
a four for five basis; at $1.25 million a copy 16,000 ACE 3000s
costing $20 billion would replace 20,000 Geeps costing costing
$15 billion at $750,000 apiece. If current inflation rates and taxes
require something like a 28% return on investment just to break
even, the railroads would lose something like $200 million a
year on the ACE 3000s. The figures of course are sketchy to say
the least, but if they are anywhere close to target they ironically
echo H.F.Brown's argument of twenty years ago that the
operating savings of diesels were substantially outweighed by
their increased capital costs.
Thus the ACE 3000 apparently forsakes the traditional
advantage of steam locomotives, that of substantially lower
capital costs. Thus also it is aimed at the wrong shortage. The
present economic crisis is not so much an oil or energy
shortage as it is a capital shortage. A severe questioning is long
overdue not only for the excessively capital intensive "high
technology" celebrated by J.K. Galbraith in THE NEW
INDUSTRIAL STATE but even more for its financing. Such
technology in Galbraith's view requires such heavy capital
outlays so far in advance of production that the market for the
product may well evaporate by the time production is completed.
Thus "management of demand" in specific markets and
"regulation of aggregate demand" for the economy as a whole.
Without "regulation of aggregate demand," Galbraith said in
1967, capital and technology would have to be used far more
cautiously; without it we would see a market economy in which
planning would be impossible, in which the small firm would at
last do quite well, making simple products with unspecialized
labor. We would have to renounce the technology we have been
taught to revere since birth, however. What Galbraith reveals,
albeit between the lines, is that "high technology" is by no means
a product of the market economy, but is rather that of an
elaborate and deliberate system of subsidy and protection. Its
justification is not economic but political; in other words, it is a
sacred cow.
H.F. Brown's argument that the capital costs of diesel
locomotives outweighed their operating savings is all the more
forceful when we realize that Keynesian "regulation of aggregate
demand" artificially lowered interest rates in the period he
considered. Such policies have caused the dissipation of capital
our economy now suffers from and with their end we can expect
to see an economy that conserves rather than dissipates capital.
Thus also we will see a drastic shift in technology, when
boondoggles cannot be financed by an artificial demand and
when interest rates accurately reflect capital costs. This is when
steam locomotives will make a comeback, but probably not ACE
3000s. A refinement of Withuhn's 1974 proposals will be more
what the situation calls for, as their capital costs should be little
more than traditional steam locomotives' . Even traditional steam
locomotives would be competitive with diesels in the
forthcoming economic environment. Already the Crab Orchard
and Egyptian has restored a 2-8-0 for $50,000 rather thqn buy a
second-hand diesel or $250,000. (RAILFAN & RAILROAD, July
1980) Thus Perry Shoemaker's prediction that rising capital and
oil costs will bring steam back to the branch lines (TRAINS,
March 1978) has already begun to come true.
It is on fast, heavy freights, however, that the steam locomotive
should find its true home. Compare performance figures for the
EMD SD45 (TRAINS, January 1974) with the feats of the N&W
Class A. A Class A could AVERAGE over 30 mph start to stop
with a 14,500 coal train (STEAM'S FINEST HOUR) while an
SD45 can only do 35 mph with a 5,000 ton train on straight, level
track. On straight, level track a Class A hauled a 7,500 ton train at
64 mph (N&W: GIANT OF STEAM, p192), while three SD45s are
required to haul a 5,000 ton train at 62 mph. The Nickel Plate
determined in the late 1940s that replacing its Berkshires with
three unit diesels on only four fast freights would cost an
additional $250,000 and reduce train speeds to boot. (TRAINS,
October 1962)
H. F. Brown noted twenty years ago that the N&W contracted its
first major debt for dieselization, having previously financed
major improvements out of earnings. A failure to explore capital
conserving technology certainly raises the question whether the
railroads are being soaked with massive debts as in times past
and gives credence to John Kneiling's cynicism that the
railroads are not being run for their own profits but rather those
of banks and suppliers (TRAINS, August 1980) Best wishes, by
all means, to American Coal Enterprises, but please, please,
take a very hard look at the capital costs of your proposal
compared to those of diesels and traditional steam locomotives.

Corrections since 1980-
Kevin Holland's book on the van Sweringen Berkshires raises
questions about the Nickel Plate tests.
LeMassena's July 1993 article in MAINLINE MODELER on
Class A mysteries said the 7500 tons was apparently a misprint
for 750, as on a heavy passenger train.
The Crab Orchard & Egyptian experiment fizzled.
Can anyone explain how a 7,000 hp souped up four unit F7
could haul those N&W trains almost as fast as the three SD45s
with over twice the rated hp?

Brown said that when diesels emerged from high mileage
special service into general assignments, they could no longer
accumulate such mileage, a statement DPM rather elliptically
prefigured in that same April 1950 TRAINS:
"... because a new steam locomotive could still depreciate its
investment on a monthly mileage less than its capacity, the true
long-distance assignments that man of them were quite capable
of handling had to await the diesel. The diesel offered no choice;
to earn money on its far greater cost, a carrier had to keep it in
service every possible hour."

The November 1963 article on Lima diesels gave Brown more
respectful attention.
William F. Wendt, Jr

economic case for high speed steam

To:	steam_tech@yahoogroups.com
From:	"wholelephant" Add to Address Book Add Mobile Alert
Date:	Tue, 15 Aug 2006 16:02:47 -0000
Subject:	[steam_tech] economic case for high speed steam

EXTENDING THE ARGUMENT
Mark Twain spoke of a cat that once jumped on a hot stove and
never again jumped on a stove again. Experience is the best
teacher, but it can be the worst teacher too, if not properly
analyzed. There is nothing so dangerous as a half-truth. If you
have to think outside the box all the time, your box is too small.
Let's see how these little profoundities apply in the railroad
industry, one example, anyway.
High-speed steam was indeed misused in low-speed service,
per Ed King's article (September 2004), perhaps the definitive
piece on the point. The N&W Y-6b would have been far more
economical in the 20 mph service performed by numerous high
wheel, high horsepower locomotives. There it might have held
off the diesel, at least a bit longer. Like, nevertheless, Bill
Withuhn's otherwise superb June 1974 article on steam
scrapped too soon, it only points a finger at poor drag freight
performance. In this same vein, the stillborn ACE project of the
1980s was a GP40 substitute aimed at the diesel's strong hold,
drag freight. King's superficial overview of diesels was, again,
aimed only at drag freight effectiveness. It did not deal with their
fundamental problems, and, minor points excepted, broke no
new ground. The article is a lot of shoulda coulda woulda without
extending the argument:
Super-Power came along four decades ahead of its real market
for speed.
The railroads dieselized on fast, light trains and slow, heavy
trains, on which the diesel's advantages were most apparent.
This engrossing experience left the industry and observers
ill-equipped to cope with the fast, heavy trains that came a
decade or so afterwards. Electrification was briefly touted; at
least the catenary's abundant power would not have left traction
motors starved at speed by constant horsepower mobile
generation.
Modern steam's advantages were lost in a lot of "everybody
knows."
Let's boil this down to one practical, but still current, question:
What if the New York Central Niagaras had lasted long enough
to be used on Flexi-Van trains, instead of being relegated to drag
freights and scrapped less than five years before?
On the one hand, the Niagaras were deliberately designed with
more power than necessary. At 60 mph the "standard" Niagara
was considerably more powerful than a three unit 6000 hp E7, if
indeed less powerful at 30 mph. Not only that, it was actually
less expensive to operate. It could also keep pace with the
diesel's long locomotive runs and utilization. Niagaras were built
with poppet valves, a longer combustion chamber, and higher
steam pressure, although not on the same locomotive. The little
tried Geisl exhaust was also available. (TRAINS, March 1984)
On the other hand the average freight train speed in the
dieselization decade, 1945-1955, was 17 mph. (TRAINS, June
1974) At such speeds the constant horsepower diesel-electric is
in its own element. All that power is available as long as the
wheels do not slip or the traction motors burn up. Freight diesels
geared for 65 mph could develop their full horsepower at 10 or
12 mph. Rather few modern steamers were designed to operate
efficiently under 40 mph, the Y6b being a notable exception. The
diesel is indeed a terrific drag freight locomotive, coming when
the railroads were still a drag freight operation, two decades of
Super-Power notwithstanding.
Although the early streamliners gave the diesel an image of
speed, the constant horsepower diesel has a severe problem
on fast, heavy trains. That abundant tractive effort at low speed
falls rapidly in the middle range and tapers off to a dribble in the
upper ranges. Remember the xy=k or y=k/x curves in first year
algebra? That is what you get when speed x tractive effort equals
a constant horsepower.
It was well known in early dieselization that comparable
steamers were more powerful above 25 mph or so, but this was
well forgotten when it would have made a difference. With the
blossoming of fast intermodal traffic in the early 1960's the newly
dieselized railroads had a problem. Flexi-Vans soaked up power
in "elephantine" proportions. So said an October 1962 TRAINS
photo section caption of five GP20s, a GP9, and an F7, 13,250
hp., on a Flexi-Van. The point was not totally obscure. Jerry
Pinkepank's article on electrification recorded it for posterity, July
1970 TRAINS:
"Probably the biggest factor causing renewed interest in
electrification is the delayed reaction now taking place on the
railroads regarding the costs of the freight-train speed-up of the
1960's. When the railroads shifted off 1-horsepower- per-ton
locomotive ratios and began buying super-diesels for hypoed
freight schedules, they entered a new era in costs. Piling on the
units- even after `unit reduction' resulting from use of 3000
h.p.-plus locomotives- also piles on the expenses for fuel and
locomotive and maintenance costs..."
Robert Le Massena amplified the point in TRAINS, January
1974, noting EMD's venture into electrification as its recognition
of the problem:
"... In terms of diesel-electric propulsion, the price of speed is
too great. On level, tangent track in fair weather, a single 3600
h.p. SD45 unit can just maintain 35 mph with 5000 tons. Two
SD45's are needed for 51 mph, and three units are required at
62 mph. Four times as many units must be used at twice the 35
mph pace..."
Second generation diesels had a horsepower race that ran its
course by the early 1970s. By 1976 it was not enough to save
Santa Fe's Super C intermodal, on a 40 hr. Chicago-LA
passenger schedule, from needing twice the diesel horsepower
at 70 mph as at 50. The diesels "crapped out" at speed on test
runs. (TRAINS, May 1986)
In TRAINS, April 1990, Gary Dolzall explained the dire squeeze
between high speed cost and truck competitive pricing. Santa Fe
had concluded that Super C's 6hp/ton and 79 mph running were
uneconomic well before the Kuwait crisis surcharges:
"Another way to guage what's hot in Santa Fe's stable is the
horsepower-to- ton ratio that the System Operation Center (SOC)
in Chicago assigns trains. Nos. 199 and 991 generally get about
5 horsepower per ton; trains like 188, 189, 198, 891 and the
transcon Q-trains get about 4. In comparison, a priority freight or
lesser intermodal train will be assigned about 2.5 or 3 hp/ton;
Santa Fe's doublestackers get a little over 2, and a typical unit
coal train in flatland territory gets perhaps 1.2.
"Indeed, the real key for AT&SF is to be consistently truck
competitive- not only in speed, but in pricing... there is no simple
answer to what the market pays. But as a ballpark figure, you can
guess the 'street rate' (i.e., no discount) rate for a 45 foot trailer
moving from Corwith to the West Coast at something over
$1,300; a container on a stack train will probably be $200 less.
Those kinds of rates... largely preclude the fuel bills which would
correspond to Super C's 79 mph running and locomotive
assignments over 6 horsepower per ton. Nonetheless, Santa Fe
intermodals do still roll along at 70 mph. Certainly, part of the
reason AT&SF's operating ratio is high is that intermodal traffic is
both service-intensive and ultra price-competitive, and that
combination, no matter how well- oiled the machinery, inevitably
closes the gap between operating revenues and operating
costs."
The route's fastest freight timing lately is over 51 hours, today's
limit, not of physical, but of economic reality. (TRAINS, November
2000)
The railroads still have a problem. In 1989 Thomas Finkbiner,
Norfolk Southern VP-intermodal, said all the new doublestacks,
skeleton cars, Roadrailers, etc., were essentially scrap metal
unless they could average 55 mph instead of 25 (a decade and
a half later, barely 20). (Modern Railroads, November 1989)
The new AC locomotives are terrific at 10 mph, at half again the
capital cost. That might be fine for captive bulk traffic, but they
have no significant advantage for speed competitive, marginal
intermodal traffic.
Mobile generation still requires four to six times the generating
capacity used at any given time, based upon the WW II Pennsy
study that the central power plant load was generally 16% of the
total electric fleet horsepower and never more than 22%.
(Barriger's foreword, Middleton, When the Steam Roads
Electrified) That is a lot of excess, unusable capacity, AC or DC.
See Insull's nineteenth century argument, that centralized power
accomodates peak loads occuring at different times and allows
a smaller total capacity. For all the dizzy changes elsewhere,
Pinkepank's 1970 article could be updated in the proverbial
twenty-five words or less, notably that any fixed railroad
investment is difficult now.
Could the Niagara have revised locomotive economics four and
a half decades ago? And, in turn, the intermodal industry? It was
too powerful for the NYC passenger trains of the late 1940s, but
the Flexi-Vans a decade later would have been just the outlet for
its excess energy.
Would we still be using Niagaras today? Perhaps so, as
stagnant as motive pwer thinking can be at times. Even the
Niagara, however, did not exploit such technology as four
cylinder divided drive, high speed compounding, and double
Belpaire fireboxes, which would have increased performance at
both high speed and low. (TRAINS, June 1974)
Or a turbine. Contemporary with the Niagara was the
Pennsylvania' s direct drive S2 steam turbine. It was marvelously
efficient at speed, but was scrapped because of a leaky boiler.
(Pennypacker, Pennsy Power) As I diagnose the problem over a
half-century later, it drained the boiler at low speeds, at which a
deflection displacement turbine is little more than a hole in the
boiler, causing a drastic pressure drop, boiler contractions, and
leaks. Such a simple expedient as a reverse gear for the small
reverse turbine, however, would have let it start the train and let
the larger one cut in at proper speed. It exhausted steam at
barely atmospheric pressure, ready to condense and be reused,
also indicating a high thermal efficiency. A King Kong booster
might get a new turbine up to 20 or 30 mph, or perhaps a split
drive torque converter would allow the turbine proper rpm at low
speed. Coal fired steam turbines generate most of our electricity
today but no one wants to dieselize them.
How about a Garratt, perhaps, with as unconstrained a boiler
and unobstructed a firebox as is possible on standard guage
rails? With twice the grate area of a 6,000 hp articulated, it would
have twice the horsepower. If we can double the boiler pressure,
a big "if," to be sure, we would double the power again.
Average 55 mph? How about 100? Higher speeds generally
would be one approach to the new rail undercapacity problem,
the old overcapacity problem having been solved about a decade
ago. There is a lot more to fast, reliable rail service than
over-the-road speed, and more to that than motive power, to be
sure, but this is the real market for new Super-Power, now eight
decades later.
P.S. How about industrial hemp as a possible external
combustion biomass fuel and possible crop for the badlands?
Figure the rough, open, contiuous fires of external combustion
are far less finicky about fuel than the closed, precisely
machined, often intermittent fires of internal combustion, thus
much more easily satisfied with some less expensive and
environmentally damaging product from tar sands or oil shale?
How about sulphur-eating bacteria, per PBS nature special on
formation of caverns out west?
P.P.S. In some 48,000 postings there does not seem to be any
discussion of H.F. Brown, "Economic Results of Diesel Electric
Motive Power on the Railways of the United States of America,"
Institution of Mechanical Engineers, London, editorialized upon
in TRAINS, March 1961. I have a copy of the published
proceedings with a lively discussion afterwards (as opposed to
the occasional advance copy). Brown, with railroad experience
going back to the New Haven electrification of 1905, argued the
railroads made money on diesel switchers but lost money on
diesel road locomotives.
William F. Wendt, Jr

Restore Peoria & Eastern

To:	PeoriaandEastern@yahoogroups.com
From:	"wholelephant" Add to Address Book Add Mobile Alert
Date:	Mon, 31 Jul 2006 20:19:48 -0000
Subject:	[PeoriaandEastern] restore p&e

RESTORE THE PEORIA AND EASTERN
Does all rail freight have to go through Chicago? Once upon a
time it was "quicker via Peoria," 210 direct, unobstructed miles
on the Peoria and Eastern between Peoria and Indianapolis
instead of 350 miles via Chicago and congestion.
Much has changed in the quarter century since the P&E was an
unbroken route. For over a century the railroads had an
overcapacity problem, one solved by the mid-1990s by
increasing traffic and decreasing route-miles. The Chicago
railroads are now seeking $1.5 billion in public and private funds
for the CREATE (Chicago Regional and Transportation
Efficiency) program to upgrade trackage and ease congestion,
which so far has not gotten the expected appropriation from
Congress.
37,000 freight cars move through the Chicago area every day
(CREATE brochure). Some 25% does not originate or terminate
there ("Freight Rail Futures," Chicago Department of
Transportation website). That is over 9,000 cars a day, easily 90
or 100 trains, merely moving through the area.
Do they all have to go through Chicago? Is Chicago always on
the shortest, most direct route? Obviously not. Rail officials are
looking into alternatives now that political funding has come up
short. (Crain's Chicago Business, Jan. 16, 2006; TRAINS, March
2006) On rerouting traffic, now under consideration, TRAINS
said, "… railroads may wind up sacrificing revenue if reroutes
result in shorter hauls."
Exactly. There is a deeply encrusted practice of "long-routing" to
increase the originating road's cut of revenues. Obviously it
requires a longer route, with the obvious disadvantages of
greater travel time, more expense, less reliable service, and
poorer use of now scarce rail resources.
Running everything through Chicago is defended in rail circles
on grounds of more frequent connections and keeping crews in
position. Those are usually compelling advantages, to be sure,
but not always. Bigger is not necessarily better.
Long-routing is under attack in more enlightened rail circles. By
some strange co-incidence, the principal apostle of direct
routing is Hunter Harrison, president of the Canadian National,
also the system returning considerably more on investment than
other rail lines. CN also routes traffic through Chicago (TRAINS,
March 2005).
There once were rail by-passes of Chicago, notably the Peoria
and Eastern. It has not functioned as a through route since a
bridge washout in 1981 and getting caught in merger backwash.
In its heyday it handled about 40,000 cars a year or 110 a day,
less than 2% of the traffic now going through Chicago.
What it would take to restore I do not know. It can be more
difficult to restore an abandoned line than to build a new one. It
would need connections to the BNSF and UP lines to the north to
be fully effective, perhaps over its also bygone Peoria
connection, the Minneapolis and St. Louis, or the old Burlington
route to Galesburg.
There is also the still functioning Toledo, Peoria and Western,
which has little if any bridge traffic and perhaps inadequate
eastern connections. Under the best of circumstances it would
be a considerably longer route between Peoria and Indianapolis.
There are also abandoned Pennsy, B&O, and Nickel Plate lines
in the area that might be considered, especially if obstacles
preclude any P&E segment.
These questions need a full study, the obvious next step.
If we need political action for rail investment, how about tax-free
bonds, which neither burden nor subsidize?
William F. Wendt, Jr.