economic case for high speed steam, cont.

To:	steam_tech@yahoogroups.com
From:	"wholelephant" Add to Address Book Add Mobile Alert
Date:	Fri, 18 Aug 2006 21:43:57 -0000
Subject:	[steam_tech] economic case for high speed steam

H.F. Brown, "Economic Results of Diesel Electric Motive Power
on the Railways of the United States of America," Institution of
Mechanical Engineers, London, was printed in the institute's
proceedings, Vol 175 No 5 1961, p257 ff, comprising the initial
statement in two parts, discussion by nine members attending
the presentation beginning p 275, communications apparently
from those not attending beginning p283, the author's reply
begining p292, and a one page report of an ordinary (sic- those
limeys!) on p318. There were mentions of an advance copy, one
of which is in the Northwestern U Transportation Library. There
are many charts and graphs.
Maybe it is on-line somewhere. If not, maybe the Institute can be
inveigled to put it on-line or otherwise make it available.
Otherwise check large engineering libraries. Again, I am amazed
that in some 48,000 postings here there does not seem to be
any discussion of it.
On the same March 1961 editorial page that DPM chided
unimaginative management, he also set a still durable editorial
policy:
"We of TRAINS know and respect Mr. Brown as both a reader
and a provocative correspondent. Moreover, we would
instinctively lean toward those who would question the status
quo and/or debate The Big Claim. It is perhaps surprising, in this
instance, that no one of authority has taken issue with
dieselization since Lima gave up the ghost and Roanoke quit
building locomotives. Finally, we are not prepared to engage in
point-by-point rebuttal to Mr. Brown's paper, being content to
leave such statistical cross-fire to more qualified pencil-pushers
than ourselves and to those with more selfish claims (diesel
builders and owners)."
As for his own pencil-pushing, the next paragraph refers to N&W
2-6-6-4s hauling 14,500 ton coal trains and having a 107,525 lb.
axle loading. His own Steam's Finest Hour, however, lists the
Class A having 432,350 lb. on drivers, or some 72,000 lb. per
axle. He also considered it equivalent to three 1750 hp. six axle
units. In that regard, consider the modest effort by yours truly,
which he rejected in 1980, which has actually held up quite well,
other than the exceptions afterwards:

DID EDITOR MORGAN AND ACE BOTH SPEAK TOO SOON?
A recently purchased April 1950 TRAINS has these comments
by its present editor:
"... The road switcher... was a locomotive refreshingly new to the
industry- a class of power unlikely in electrification, out of the
question in steam...
"At one stroke, this unit... could replace a score of specialized
steam designs. The Pacific that held down suburban 5:15's, the
short wheelbase 0-6-0 that worked tight industrial sidings, the
low-drivered Mike assigned for yard-to-yard transfer hauls, the
branch-line 0-8-0- all could be doubled for by a stock model
1500 horsepower diesel of this flexible design." (p19)
In June 1974, however, editor Morgan printed Bill Withuhn's
major query as to whether steam was scrapped too soon. It
seems indeed that technology existing in the late 1940s could
have been used to produce a locomotive highly competitive with
the diesel, overcoming many of steam's traditional limitations.
The locomotives Withuhn elaborated upon, however, with such
features as high-speed compounding, balanced four cylinder
interconnected drives, double Belpaire fireboxes, high-speed
boosters and Geisl exhausts, were aimed at lash-ups of 6,000
plus horsepower, not at the humble but far more threatening
road-switcher. Withuhn's superb effort needs a follow-up, one
that may prove the then associate editor somewhat but quite
understandably short-sighted.
Perhaps Withuhn's collection of technology could have been
applied to the likes of the 4-6-4T used by Jersey Central or the
4-6-6T on the Boston and Albany. Another two or four wheels
would be needed to support the high pressure cylinders, which
might have to be placed inside with cut-outs to clear the rear
driving axle. Thus we might have a locomotive with the speed of
the Pacific, the agility of the 0-6-0, the tractive effort of the
low-drivered Mike, and the low axle loading of the 2-8-0. It could
even run in either direction, the same as a road-switcher. The
only trick left is multiple unit capability, but the N&W was halfway
there with its Automatic 4-8-0. So far this exercise has been
confined to the situation thirty years ago, as was Withuhn's.
Today, however, a commuter locomotive would need a 600 hp.
turbogenerator for HEP commuter cars, which in freight service
might power traction motors replacing high maintainance
boosters.
Certainly there is much to be said for looking back, perhaps for
its own sake, but more importantly as an invaluable g;uide in
looking ahead. With that in mind the question for American Coal
Enterprises is whether the proposed ACE 3000 constitutes
dedieselization or redieselization instead. Per figures in Dec.
1980 TRAINS, it would save the railroads $1.2 billion a year in
fuel costs, certainly an impressive figure, reminiscent of a major
advantage diesel had over steam. It would replace GP-40-2s on
a four for five basis; at $1.25 million a copy 16,000 ACE 3000s
costing $20 billion would replace 20,000 Geeps costing costing
$15 billion at $750,000 apiece. If current inflation rates and taxes
require something like a 28% return on investment just to break
even, the railroads would lose something like $200 million a
year on the ACE 3000s. The figures of course are sketchy to say
the least, but if they are anywhere close to target they ironically
echo H.F.Brown's argument of twenty years ago that the
operating savings of diesels were substantially outweighed by
their increased capital costs.
Thus the ACE 3000 apparently forsakes the traditional
advantage of steam locomotives, that of substantially lower
capital costs. Thus also it is aimed at the wrong shortage. The
present economic crisis is not so much an oil or energy
shortage as it is a capital shortage. A severe questioning is long
overdue not only for the excessively capital intensive "high
technology" celebrated by J.K. Galbraith in THE NEW
INDUSTRIAL STATE but even more for its financing. Such
technology in Galbraith's view requires such heavy capital
outlays so far in advance of production that the market for the
product may well evaporate by the time production is completed.
Thus "management of demand" in specific markets and
"regulation of aggregate demand" for the economy as a whole.
Without "regulation of aggregate demand," Galbraith said in
1967, capital and technology would have to be used far more
cautiously; without it we would see a market economy in which
planning would be impossible, in which the small firm would at
last do quite well, making simple products with unspecialized
labor. We would have to renounce the technology we have been
taught to revere since birth, however. What Galbraith reveals,
albeit between the lines, is that "high technology" is by no means
a product of the market economy, but is rather that of an
elaborate and deliberate system of subsidy and protection. Its
justification is not economic but political; in other words, it is a
sacred cow.
H.F. Brown's argument that the capital costs of diesel
locomotives outweighed their operating savings is all the more
forceful when we realize that Keynesian "regulation of aggregate
demand" artificially lowered interest rates in the period he
considered. Such policies have caused the dissipation of capital
our economy now suffers from and with their end we can expect
to see an economy that conserves rather than dissipates capital.
Thus also we will see a drastic shift in technology, when
boondoggles cannot be financed by an artificial demand and
when interest rates accurately reflect capital costs. This is when
steam locomotives will make a comeback, but probably not ACE
3000s. A refinement of Withuhn's 1974 proposals will be more
what the situation calls for, as their capital costs should be little
more than traditional steam locomotives' . Even traditional steam
locomotives would be competitive with diesels in the
forthcoming economic environment. Already the Crab Orchard
and Egyptian has restored a 2-8-0 for $50,000 rather thqn buy a
second-hand diesel or $250,000. (RAILFAN & RAILROAD, July
1980) Thus Perry Shoemaker's prediction that rising capital and
oil costs will bring steam back to the branch lines (TRAINS,
March 1978) has already begun to come true.
It is on fast, heavy freights, however, that the steam locomotive
should find its true home. Compare performance figures for the
EMD SD45 (TRAINS, January 1974) with the feats of the N&W
Class A. A Class A could AVERAGE over 30 mph start to stop
with a 14,500 coal train (STEAM'S FINEST HOUR) while an
SD45 can only do 35 mph with a 5,000 ton train on straight, level
track. On straight, level track a Class A hauled a 7,500 ton train at
64 mph (N&W: GIANT OF STEAM, p192), while three SD45s are
required to haul a 5,000 ton train at 62 mph. The Nickel Plate
determined in the late 1940s that replacing its Berkshires with
three unit diesels on only four fast freights would cost an
additional $250,000 and reduce train speeds to boot. (TRAINS,
October 1962)
H. F. Brown noted twenty years ago that the N&W contracted its
first major debt for dieselization, having previously financed
major improvements out of earnings. A failure to explore capital
conserving technology certainly raises the question whether the
railroads are being soaked with massive debts as in times past
and gives credence to John Kneiling's cynicism that the
railroads are not being run for their own profits but rather those
of banks and suppliers (TRAINS, August 1980) Best wishes, by
all means, to American Coal Enterprises, but please, please,
take a very hard look at the capital costs of your proposal
compared to those of diesels and traditional steam locomotives.

Corrections since 1980-
Kevin Holland's book on the van Sweringen Berkshires raises
questions about the Nickel Plate tests.
LeMassena's July 1993 article in MAINLINE MODELER on
Class A mysteries said the 7500 tons was apparently a misprint
for 750, as on a heavy passenger train.
The Crab Orchard & Egyptian experiment fizzled.
Can anyone explain how a 7,000 hp souped up four unit F7
could haul those N&W trains almost as fast as the three SD45s
with over twice the rated hp?

Brown said that when diesels emerged from high mileage
special service into general assignments, they could no longer
accumulate such mileage, a statement DPM rather elliptically
prefigured in that same April 1950 TRAINS:
"... because a new steam locomotive could still depreciate its
investment on a monthly mileage less than its capacity, the true
long-distance assignments that man of them were quite capable
of handling had to await the diesel. The diesel offered no choice;
to earn money on its far greater cost, a carrier had to keep it in
service every possible hour."

The November 1963 article on Lima diesels gave Brown more
respectful attention.
William F. Wendt, Jr